The Effects of Central Bank Independence and Inflation Targeting On Macroeconomic Performance: Evidence from Natural Experiments

Authors

  • Michael Parkin University f Western Ontario

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15353/rea.v6i1.1410

Abstract

I investigate the effects of central bank independence and inflation targeting on macroeconomic performance in 26 advanced economies during the period 1980 to 2011. I find that both improve macroeconomic performance but inflation targeting is the more effective arrangement. When a central bank becomes more independent, it lowers the inflation rate and the variability of inflation but has no effect on real GDP or unemployment. When a central bank becomes an inflation targeter, it lowers the inflation rate, the variability of inflation, the variability of real GDP growth and the output gap, and has no effect on unemployment.

Downloads

Published

2014-09-07

Issue

Section

Articles