Search Frictions, Efficiency Wages and Equilibrium Unemployment

Auteurs-es

  • Chris Martin University of Bath
  • Bingsong Wang University of Warwick

DOI :

https://doi.org/10.15353/rea.v10i1.1507

Résumé

This paper explores the decomposition of equilibrium unemployment into involuntary and frictional components using a model that combines efficiency wages with search and matching frictions in the labour market. In deriving our results we generalise the celebrated Solow Condition, expressing the wage as the sum of a pure efficiency wage component and a component that reflects search frictions. Using standard values of calibrated parameters, we find that the bulk of unemployment is involuntary

Biographie de l'auteur-e

Bingsong Wang, University of Warwick

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Publié-e

2018-01-07

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Rubrique

Articles